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OF MURDER
The matter which it is desired to discuss under this title is the
standard method of charging the jury in murder trials as to the
meaning of the term "malice aforethought."
In most jurisdictions under an indictment for murder in the
first degree the jury may find the accused guilty of murder in
the first degree or of murder in the second degree or guilty of
manslaughter. It becomes necessary, therefore, to instruct the
jury as to the distinction between murder and manslaughter.
The usual definition of murder is the unlawful killing of one
person by another with malice aforethought; and the definition
of manslaughter is the unlawful killing of one person by another
without malice aforethought.
Let us, for simplicity of discussion, dismiss the question of the
unlawfulness of the killing, and deal with the subject as related
to an unlawful killing, so that we may concentrate our attention
solely on the term malice aforethought. The problem is to pre-
sent to the jury an explanation of the term malice aforethought
so that they can determine its existence or absence and thereby
determine whether the crime is murder or manslaughter.
Let us now consider two definitions taken from charges actually
made and very extensively followed by trial judges. One was
made by a Chief Justice of Massachusetts, one by a Chief Justice
of Connecticut, both now deceased. Let us quote from the
former:
"Malice in this definition is used in a technical sense including
not only anger, hatred and revenge, but every other unlawful and
unjustifiable motive. It is not confined to ill-will toward one
or more individuals, but is intended to denote an action flowing
from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo aninio.
where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as
carry in them the plain indications of a heart regardless of social
duty and fatally bent on mischief, and therefore malice is implied
from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however sud-
den."
Later, the Chief justice quotes from an English work as to the
meaning of malice:
"Murder is the voluntary killing of any person of malice pre-
pense or aforethought, either express or implied by law; the
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sense of which word malice is not only confined to a particular
ill-will to the deceased, but is intended to denote, as Mr. Justice
Foster expresses it, an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt
motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been at-
tended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indica-
tions of a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief."
Let us quote from the Connecticut Chief Justice:
"In common speech malice usually means hatred, ill-will, mal-
evolence or animosity existing in the mind of the accused, but
in the law of homicide its meaning is much wider. Malice, as
the word is used in an indictment for murder, not only includes
cases where the homicide proceeds from or is accompanied by a
feeling of hatred, ill-will or revenge existing in the mind of the
slayer towards the person slain, but also cases of unlawful
homicide which don't proceed from and are not accompanied by
any such feeling. In the law of homicide, if a man intends
unlawfully to kill another or do him some grievous bodily harm,
such intention, whether accompanied or not accompanied by a
feeling of hatred, ill-will or animosity, constitutes malice. * * *
Suppose A, intending to kill B, whom he hates, by mistake kills
C, his friend, whom he loves; here he did not intend to kill his
friend, and he did not hate him, but he loved him; and yet the
law says he killed his friend with malice."
These citations give the standard treatment of the term in
charges to the jury in murder cases. It seems apparent that if
the jury were left with no instructions adapted to the particular
facts in the specific case on trial, and with only the details of an
unlawful homicide spread before them and were expected to
determine whether a certain condition of mind or state of facts
called malice aforethought existed, from these definitions, they
would be hopelessly at sea. Yet as legal propositions to go to
the Supreme Court for review these citations would be im-
pregnable.
In the specific cases of the two Chief Justices cited, the jury
were not left to helplessly struggle with the application of these
definitions to the facts proven, but were told that such and such
facts within the range of the evidence would constitute murder
or manslaughter or innocence.
The impossibility of applying these standard definitions to the
facts of a case and determining whether malice aforethought
exists is made very manifest by considering a few examples of
unlawful killing.
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A father and mother are at the bedside of a little child dying
with hydrophobia; the physicians say the child has forty-eight
hours to live; its agony is indescribable; the father and mother
cannot endure that the child should suffer so, and in their love
for the child calmly, prayerfully soak a cloth with chloroform
and put the child to a speedier death because of its agony; the
killing was unlawful. Was it with malice aforethought and so
murder?
A young man and his brother, whom he loves, enter a saloon;
they meet companions; one of the brothers becomes so intoxicated
that he has no appreciation of his surroundings; in his drunken-
ness he draws a revolver and shoots it aimlessly into a crowd and
kills his brother. The killing is unlawful. Is it with malice afore-
thought, and therefore murder?
l3oth of these cases are in law an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, and therefore murder. In one love alone actuated
the deed; in the other the mind of the slayer was a motiveless
blank.
A consideration of these instances in the light of the standard
definitions shows the hopelessness of attempting to guide the
jury by such definitions. The definitions affect the jury by pro-
ducing confusion in their minds, as they affect any one who has
tried to get a clear conception of malice aforethought from them
or the text-books on homicide, which speak of this malice as if it
were a definite, comprehensible state of mind. Should we go on
using confusing definitions, or should a general definition be
abandoned and the court confine its charge to the facts of the
given case, saying merely that if you find such and such facts,
that would be murder, or manslaughter, or innocence?
It is an instructive commentary on these confusing standard
definitions of malice aforethought, to know that when the facts
are given there is not the slightest difficulty under the law in
distinguishing a case of murder from one of manslaughter.
The jury are never the judges of whether a certain fixed state
of facts constitutes one crime or the other. The law determines
on a fixed state of fact whether the crime is murder or man-
slaughter, and it is the duty of the court to give the jury the
facts which, under the evidence, would constitute either crime.
In support of the proposition that the court should abandon
the standard text-boqk style of charging the jury and simply
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give the jury instructions as to whether an unlawful killing is
murder or manslaughter by saying in substance, if you find the
facts to be so and so (never using the term malice), the crime is
murder, if so and so, manslaughter, let us quote from the examin-
ation of Baron Bramwell before the Homicide Law Amendment
Committee. The Baron said:
"I think a judge who knows his business never troubles the
jury with needless definitions, but he deals with the particular
case before him, and says, for instance, in the case which I have
put: 'The first question that you have to consider is' (forgive a
sort of model summing up) 'did the man die of the injuries which
he received? The doctors prove he did. The next question is,
did the prisoner commit them? As to which the evidence is
so and so. Now, you have to consider if you are of opinion that
he is at least guilty of having killed him, whether it is murder;
and that depends on the extent of the blows and the place they
were directed to. If you think he intended to kill him, and did,
it matters not what means he used; but suppose he did not in-
tend it, you must consider whether the means used were likely to
do it.' If you observe, in that case you lay down no definition;
you assume that the jury and you both know what the law is;
or you tell them what the law is in that particular case. I frankly
confess that if I had to give a jury a definition, 'First of all,
gentlemen, I have to tell you what homicide is, and then what
criminal homicide is, and then what is not criminal homicide,'
I expect the jury would be utterly bewildered. It is my duty as a
judge to inform myself of the meaning of the act, and not to
trouble the jury with a definition except so far as necessary."
That certainly is refreshing.
Is it too much to say that our accustomed use of a standard
definition of malice aforethought has not only confused juries,
but sometimes counsel and court?
In his Digest of the Criminal Law, Sir James F. Stephen has
made the best attempt yet made to give a rational and intelligible
definition of malice aforethought. He there says on page 16I:
"Malice aforethought means any one or more of the following
states of mind preceding or co-existing with the act or omission
by which death is caused and it may exist where the act is un-
premeditated:
"(a) An intention to cause the death of or grievous bodily
harm to any person whether such person is the person actually
killed or not.
"(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will prob-
ably cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to some person
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whether such person is the person actually killed or not, al-
though such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether
death pr grievous bodily harm is caused or not or by a wish
that it may not be caused.
"(c) An intent to commit a felony.
"(d) (As to opposing an officer)."
But at the close of these definitions he says: "This article is
subject to the provisions contained in ,articles 224-226, both in-
clusive, as to the effect of provocation." Then he regrets the
use of such a term as malice aforethought.
Therefore these definitions of Stephen's cannot be used as
general definitions unless you accompany them with a list of
mitigating circumstances which may make an act causing death,
in the states of mind as defined by him above, manslaughter.
His definitions are, therefore, useful as a guide to the court
in determining the crime in certain possible states of fact and
thereby aiding the court to guide the jury, but they are not useful
as specific general directions under which a jury could dis-
tinguish a murder from a. manslaughter.
But suppose that we are wedded to the habit of giving broad,
general definitions to the jury. Is there not some better method
to pursue than by giving the sfandard confusing definitions?
A way out of the difficulty, presented to a trial judge in deal-
ing with malice aforethought, is indicated in the case of State v.
Marx. On page 23 of the opinion in that case, the court quotes
from the charge given by the trial judge the following:
"The matter has been summarized in these words: 'Malice
includes all those states of the mind in which a homicide is com-
mitted without legal justification, extenuation or excuse.' And as
a final word on the subject, I may say to you that when an un-
lawful homicide is shown to have been committed and its attend-
ing circumstances disclose nothing to mitigate, extenuate or
excuse the act, malice in the slayer will be presumed."
While this feature of the charge was not passed upon in the
case, it suggests a solution.
Taking this quotation as a guide to clarity of treatment, is
not the actual condition of the law as to malice aforethought
in relation to unlawful homicide disclosed by a definition of the
term in one of the two following ways?
178 Conn., 17.
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Malice aforethought is any condition of mind in which a
person kills another, unlawfully, in the absence of circumstances
attending the act causing death which the law recognizes as suffi-
cient to mitigate or extenuate the act and reduce the crime to
manslaughter. Or, having the courage of the truth and aban-
doning the fiction that malice aforethought relates to a state of
mind, define it as follows:
Malice aforethought means any conditions (state of facts) un-
der which one person kills another, unlawfully, in the absence
of circumstances attending the act causing death which the law
recognizes as sufficient to mitigate or extenuate the act and re-
duce the crime to manslaughter.
As we stated in substance at the outset, the circumstances at-
tending an act of unlawful homicide which the law recognizes as
sufficient to mitigate the act and reduce the crime to manslaughter
are all definitely defined. The jury are never left by the court
to determine what facts ought to mitigate the offense and reduce
the crime; on the contrary, if the state of the evidence calls for
it, the court tells the jury the facts which so reduce the crime,
and only leaves the existence or a reasonable supposition of the
existence of such facts for their determination. This definition
is, of course, only saying to the jury that murder is murder.
But that is the only helpful thing that is ever said to the jury.
I mean by this, that the trial court tells the jury the existence of
what facts under the evidence they must find in order to find
that an unlawful homicide is murder.
No intelligent court would ever think of giving the standard
definitions of malice aforethought, and then tell the jury to apply
such definitions to the facts and determine the crime. Would it
not be sufficient in a murder trial to tell the jury that they must
determine:
i. That the victim was killed by some person other than him-
self.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was unlawful. (With such explanation, if
any, as the evidence calls for as to justifiable or excusable
homicide.)
4. (After stating that if the killing was unlawful, the crime
is murder or manslaughter.) That in order to find the accused
guilty of murder the jury must find that the act causing death
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was not attended by circumstances which the law recognizes as
sufficient to extenuate the act and reduce the crime to man-
slaughter. (Stating to the jury that it is the duty of the court
to inform them what circumstances under the evidence in the
case would so extenuate the act and giving instructions as to any
evidence in the case, if any there were, tending to show the ex-
istence of any such mitigating circumstances.)
In dealing with the preliminary question of whether a killing
is lawful or unlawful, the relation of a killing by accident in
perpetrating a crime can be dealt with in the charge.
How has it arisen that the standard definitions are so generally
used? It is a probable explanation, that they began to be used
as warnings to the jury not to interpret the term malice afore-
thought by the ordinary meaning of the words as used in daily
life; and that these warnings became perverted into definitions.
The real usefulness of the term malice aforethought is in the
indictment. It there abridges the statement of facts. An un-
lawful killing by a blow of the fist on the head may be man-
slaughter or murder, the pleader is not required to recite the
facts in the indictment, which make it in his opinion murder;
he need only say that the accused killed him by a blow of the
fist on the head with malice aforethought. It is only when we
attempt to define the expression in the charge to the jury that it
becomes a stumbling block.
As to the use of the terms express and implied malice, they
became necessary only after the general definitions came into use,
and these terms have rendered confusion worse confounded.
When you tell the jury that a simple harmless person without a
touch of malignity in his composition has committed murder by
shooting a pistol into a crowd when so drunk as to be incapable
of knowing what he was doing, then in order to get his state of
mind to square with the general definition of malice as "a de-
praved heart fatally bent on mischief," you are compelled to
inject such a state of mind into his brain and call it implied malice.
If you say instead that he unlawfully killed another in the ab-
sence of any extenuating circumstances which the law recog-
nizes as sufficient to mitigate the offense and reduce it to man-
slaughter (drunkenness not being an extenuating circumstance),
you avoid the added confusion of definitions of express and im-
plied malice.
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A considerable examination of this subject discloses that
malice aforethought has no useful function outside of the indict-
ment, and that as to its being defined in an intelligible way for
the guidance of the jury as a recognizable state of mind, it is a
simple impossibility. In truth it has no meaning whatever in that
sense. It is a technical term which is used for convenience as
covering all unlawful killings which the law deems murder.
When an unlawful killing has been decided to be murder, the
application of the statutory definitions of first degree murder is
free from difficulty.
Howard I. Curtis.
Superior Court of Connecticut.
